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OPEN SEASON: STREET HARASSMENT AS TRUE THREATS 
SOPEN B. SHAH 
 Women in public places—streets, parks, and buses—are often victims of harassment and sex-
ual misconduct by strangers. Street harassment (or sex hassling, as it is sometimes known) is a 
longstanding and pervasive phenomenon that has only recently entered the public consciousness. 
It remains largely undocumented and underexplored in academia. This Article defines the con-
tours of the problem and its harms, and evaluates its fit within the current legal framework. Even 
though street harassment falls within the definition of many types of illegal conduct, it remains 
unrecognized by law enforcement and courts. 
Part I describes street harassment and its context. Part II details its harms in a legally 
cognizable way under current statutes prohibiting, inter alia, assault, harassment, and disorderly 
conduct. In Part III, I analyze cases to explain why these laws do not successfully capture many 
instances of street harassment. I also argue that street harassment falls within the underdeveloped 
but promising “true threat” exception to the First Amendment right to free speech, and further 
contend that providing legal redress for these verbal assaults merely extends current protections 
against harmful speech to women. Part IV proposes a tort remedy, drawing from Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, to address such harassment in two locations: 1) public work sites (e.g., construc-
tion areas) and 2) public transportation. I also advocate for a complementary social movement to 
reduce the incidence of harassment, since the prevalence of street harassment often undermines 
women’s legal claims. 
Today’s women suffer many kinds of grievous harm, including rape and sexual assault. 
Verbal violence is the very foundation of a system that condones and perpetuates gender-based 
physical aggression. As long as these assaults against women continue daily on our streets, un-
recognized and unpunished, stopping other attacks that occur in homes and workplaces will be 
challenging if not impossible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I’d decided to brave the run across the street to the little bodega anyway be-
cause I’d been out of dishwasher soap and milk and coffee filters for three days. 
As I walked up the steps to the entrance, two men walked out. Because I’m a 
woman who’s been trained by society not to look strange men in the eye when 
its dark out and they look potentially threatening, I didn’t. But they stopped in 
the doorway and came up close to me, speaking far louder than was necessary. 
“Whoa mama, look at those tits.” “Daaaaamn. Naw like really dog, 
daaaaaaamn.” One started masturbating and pushed up close to my face as I 
stared at the ground, trying to navigate around them. He rubbed himself and 
licked his lips as he undressed me with his eyes and loudly proclaimed what 
he’d do to me.“Guys, stop it[,]” I said in my tired, exasperated and slightly 
pissed off voice. 
. . . . 
They were pissed. One pushed me into the doorframe as I tried to pass. Both 
started screaming at me – “You f—ing ugly a– b—-!!” “Who the f— you think 
you are?!” “You’ll take it and like it!!” 
. . . . 
. . . I was paralyzed with fear. 
They had screamed awfully loudly at me. What if they were waiting for me out-
side? What if they jumped me from behind the stairs as I came down? I’m car-
rying my house keys and my wallet – my wallet with my ID, which clearly says 
I live exactly across the street. What if they simply walked up behind me with a 
knife or a gun and forced me to open my front door for them? What then?
1
 
Women are sexually harassed on the street and in other public places by men who are 
strangers. This street harassment includes sexually explicit comments, catcalls, whistles, leering, 
sexist remarks, kissing, other offensive noises, and public masturbation. This Article focuses 
mainly on the speech-only aspects, though their inextricability from street harassment’s other 
components—groping, assault, public masturbation—is itself telling; this verbal violence is part 
                                                                
* Yale Law School, J.D. 2015; Harvard University, A.B. 2008. Thank you to Professor William Eskridge, who supervised 
this paper and provided invaluable feedback and guidance. I am indebted to Holly Kearl, Chai Shenoy, and Rochelle Key-
han for their helpful contributions. Thanks also to the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law & Social 
Change for their hard work and insightful suggestions throughout the editorial process. Finally, I am grateful to my par-
ents, Bharat and Pravina Shah, for their unfailing support. 
 1  Contributor, Street Harassment Is About Power, STOP STREET HARASSMENT (May 16, 2013), 
http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/2013/05/harassedatcornerstore/. 
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of the same “transaction.” Though this behavior is prevalent, as the viral YouTube video “10 
Hours of Walking in NYC as a Woman”
2
 revealed, it is widely underrepresented in legal and so-
cial science research. Surveys conducted by non-profit groups suggest that more than eighty per-
cent of women in the United States experience street harassment,
3
 yet only a handful of studies 
have been conducted since the 1980s.
4
 Other studies suggest this is a worldwide problem for 
women and LGBTQ individuals.
5
 Rarely is a social problem with such high rates of penetration 
accompanied by such low levels of documentation. Street harassment is yet another example of a 
recurring theme in feminist scholarship: that women’s experiences are consistently trivialized in 
today’s male-dominated legal culture and their injuries remain unrecognized and uncompensated.
6
 
This “brush-off”—the gap between women’s experiences and community attention—is unac-
ceptable. 
Grassroots organizations have recently coalesced around this issue, aiming to stop the 
behavior by documenting women’s stories in the public sphere and enlisting allies of all genders. 
Hollaback!, the organization behind the “10 Hours of Walking in NYC as a Woman” YouTube 
video, along with Collective Action for Safe Spaces and Stop Street Harassment have provided 
space for women to document their experiences. Since 2008, thousands of women have posted on 
blogs, Twitter (hashtags include #shoutingback and #stopstreetharassment), and other social me-
dia sites.
7
 Community advocates and artists have taken up the cause: Tatyana Fazlalizadeh is a 
Brooklyn-based artist whose paintings show women responding to gender-based street harass-
                                                                
2  10 Hours of Walking in NYC as a Woman, YOUTUBE (Oct. 28, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1XGPvbWn0A (showing a woman walking through the streets of New York City 
while being catcalled and harassed). 
            3 Oxygen/Markle Pulse Poll Finds: Harassment of Women on the Street Is Rampant; 87% of 
American Women Report Being Harassed on the Street By a Male Stranger, PR NEWSWIRE (June 22, 2000), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/oxygenmarkle-pulse-poll-finds-harassment-of-women-on-the-street-is-
rampant-87-of-american-women-report-being-harassed-on-the-street-by-a-male-stranger-73669892.html. See also CAROL 
BROOKS GARDNER, PASSING BY: GENDER AND PUBLIC HARASSMENT 89-90 (1995) (explaining that the social class of the 
male offender and the appearance of the female target cannot rationalize instances of street harassment). 
 4 See LAURA BETH NIELSEN, LICENSE TO HARASS: LAW, HIERARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE PUBLIC 
SPEECH 39 (2004) (noting a few exceptions to the general lack of empirical evidence on offensive public speech).  
 5 See Statistics, STOP STREET HARASSMENT, http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/resour 
ces/statistics/ (last visited April 5, 2015) (finding that women and LGBT-identified men experience more street harass-
ment than heterosexual men).     
 6 “Feminists generally agree—it should go without saying—that women suffer in ways which 
men do not, and that the gender-specific suffering that women endure is routinely ignored or trivialized in the larger 
(male) legal culture.” Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Femi-
nist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 149, 150 (2000). 
 7 One site, Hollaback!, claims 4500-plus experiences of street harassment have been posted. 
Debjani Roy, Deputy Director Debjani Roy Speaks Out in the Huffington Post, HOLLABACK! (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://www.ihollaback.org/blog/2013/04/. See, e.g., Twitter @StopStHarassmnt, https://twitter.com/StopStHarassmnt (last 
visited May 13, 2013); Twitter @CatcallsNYC, https://twitter.com/CatcallsNYC (last visited May 13, 2013); Why You 
Shouldn’t Tell That Random Girl On The Street That She’s Hot, FREETHOUGHTBLOGS, (May 2, 2013), 
http://freethoughtblogs.com/brutereason/2013/05/02/why-you-shouldnt-tell-that-random-girl-on-thestreet-that-shes-hot/; 
Tag Archives: harassment, REAL LIFE ATHENA: A WOMEN’S COLLECTIVE, 
http://reallifeathena.wordpress.com/tag/harassment/ (last visited May 20, 2013). 
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ment.
8
 Though awareness increased enormously after the Hollaback! YouTube video’s release, 
mentions of street harassment in U.S. news sources had been generally increasing since 2009, go-
ing from just two mentions in 2009 to sixty-three mentions in 2013. The number increased 465 
percent to 356 mentions in 2014, largely driven by the release of the Hollaback! video. Mentions 
year-to-date in 2015, when annualized, are projected to exceed even last year’s. This is in stark 
contrast with earlier years—indeed, there was only one mention during all of 2000.
9
 
Street harassment is intimately tied to traditional forms of physical violence against 
women. First, the speech often accompanies physical harm or invasion. An online survey of over 
800 women found sex hassling—sexist comments, vulgar gestures, sexually explicit comments—
is often related to physical harms such as being followed, having one’s path blocked, and being 
groped or assaulted.
10
 In addition, street harassment is often a precursor to legally cognizable and 
severe harms, including stalking, sexual assault, battery, and rape, according to hundreds of per-
sonal stories. For example, scholar Dorothy Roberts reports that a woman in her neighborhood 
“was raped by two men on her way home from the supermarket after she ignored their com-
ments.”
11
 A woman in San Francisco was stabbed in the face and arm “after she rebuffed” a man 
who harassed her on the street.
12
 Some rape perpetrators use street harassment to choose rape vic-
tims, called “rape-testing.”
13
 
Sexual violence continues to be a serious problem in the United States; nearly one in five 
women reported being the victim of rape or attempted rape.
14
 Given the number of unreported 
rapes, the actual figure is probably higher. One in six women has experienced stalking in her life-
time; one in four women has been placed in fear by potential stalking.
15
 An online survey in 2008 
found that 75 percent of female respondents have been followed by an unknown stranger in pub-
lic; 62 percent say a man has purposely blocked their path; and 57 percent reported being touched 
or grabbed in a sexual way by a stranger in public.
16
 Despite strong evidentiary support for the 
                                                                
 8 Tatyana Fazlalizadeh, About, STOP TELLING WOMEN TO SMILE, 
http://stoptellingwomentosmile.tumblr.com/about (last visited April 5, 2015). 
 9 The numbers on the mentions of “street harassment” were complied from a full-text search for 
“street harassment” in Factiva’s database of English language United States news sources (including republishing) from 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2015. This year’s number was annualized using mentions year-to-date as of April 24, 
2015. Search, FACTIVA, http://global.factiva.com/sb/default.aspx?NAPC=S (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). 
 10 Statistics–Stop Street Harassment Studies, STOP STREET HARASSMENT, 
http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/resources/statistics/sshstudies/ (last visited April 5, 2015). 
 11 Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 378 
n.95 (1993).  
 12 Bay City News, FUBU-Clad Man Hits On Woman, Then Stabs Her, S.F. APPEAL (Jan. 8, 
2013, 10:19 AM), http://sfappeal.com/2013/01/fubu-clad-man-hits-on-woman-then-stabs-her/.  
 13 H. Kearl, Groping: The Sex Crime No One Talks About, STOP STREET HARASSMENT (Feb. 8, 
2012), http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/2012/02/gropingcosmo/ (quoting Martha Langelan, former Executive Director 
of the Washington, D.C. Rape Crisis Center). 
 14 NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 1 
(2011), available at www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf.  
 15 Id. at 2, 29 n.2. 
 16 Statistics–Stop Street Harassment Studies, supra note 10. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss5/1
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link between street harassment and sexual violence, we cannot draw an official correlation be-
cause the Department of Justice unfortunately does not track street harassment incidents. 
Victims of street harassment overwhelmingly report feeling fearful, unsafe, threatened, 
and intimidated, even when no physical action accompanied a particular incident of harassment.
17
 
Research shows stranger harassment has a more consistent and significant impact on women’s 
fears than non-stranger harassment: for example, it inspires fear while “walking alone at night 
[and] using public transportation.”
18
 Because verbal harassment and physical assault are so fre-
quently linked, the possibility of physical harm and rape is ever-present and embedded in each 
stranger’s insult or sexual comment. Given the prevalence of rape and serious sexual assault, that 
is a reasonable fear for women to have.
19
 Any young woman can probably rattle off the warnings 
she frequently receives from family and friends: “don’t walk alone at night,” “don’t go through 
the park, or past this street, even in the daytime.” Such admonitions would not be commonplace if 
the threat were not real. 
In addition to these direct harms, street harassment excludes women from certain public 
spaces and public resources, confining them to the “private sphere,”
20
 and preventing them from 
achieving full citizenship. Women report taking the long way to work, avoiding the direct route to 
their homes, or choosing to exercise at home or in private gyms instead of jogging or running out-
side.
21
 Other women eschew public transportation to avoid harassment, forcing them to pay more 
money for a cab ride. Some of these daily behavior changes inhibit women’s ability to participate 
fully in public life. A 2008 survey found sixty-nine percent of women avoid making eye contact 
in public because of this issue.
22
 Women probably avoid speaking, assembling, protesting, and 
expressing themselves fully as well. A Hobbesian perspective is helpful to understand street har-
assment’s harms and the obligations of the state: a number of laws are intended to protect people 
from a lawless existence and the fear it engenders. By failing to protect women in the quintessen-
tial public place—the street—the state leaves women to fend for themselves in a vestige of the 
state of nature. The woman’s version of the street is lawless, providing no refuge, and preventing 
them from equal citizenship. 
As a ubiquitous pattern of conduct, sex hassling creates and perpetuates a society in 
which rape, assault, and other forms of sexual or gender-based violence are easier. In a parallel 
                                                                
 17 See Emily Smith, Hey Baby! Women Speak Out Against Street Harassment, CNN (Oct. 6, 
2012, 2:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/06/living/street-harassment (explaining that “[a]ggressive or sexual com-
ments alone can instill terror”).  
 18 Kimberly Fairchild & Laurie A. Rudman, Everyday Stranger Harassment and Women’s Ob-
jectification, 21 SOC. JUST. RES. 338, 341 (2008). 
 19 “Since, for women, rape is a potential outcome of any face-to-face victimization, it may be a 
primary source of anxiety.” Id. at 343.  
 20 Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 517, 520 (1993).  
 21 Twenty-four percent of women reported avoiding outside exercise for fear of street harass-
ment. There are women-only gyms. Soraya Chemaly, Do You Exercise Inside Because You Don’t Want to Be Harassed?, 
THE HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Nov. 9, 2012 5:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/soraya-chemaly/street-
harassment_b_2094307.html.  
 22 Survey, Why Stopping Street Harassment Matters, STOP STREET HARASSMENT (2008), 
http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/about/what-is-street-harassment/why-stopping-street-harassment-matters/. 
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context, Professor Mari Matsuda concludes that “an absolutist first amendment response to hate 
speech has the effect of perpetuating racism,” and that hate speech is intimately tied to hate 
crimes.
23
 Similarly, the law’s recognition and prohibition of street harassment—sexist speech—is 
necessary to effectively deter and punish violence against women. People in other countries have 
recognized the link between harassment and male sexual aggression: following a gruesome rape 
of a woman on a Delhi bus, thousands of people flooded the streets to protest “eve-teasing,” a 
term for street harassment.
24
 Ignoring this harassment perpetuates a world where women feel their 
bodies are not their own.
25
 Furthermore, the speakers sometimes intend these consequences: a 
video documentary survey of men who harassed women on the street found that a significant per-
centage intended to harm or insult them, and the majority of harassers had not given a single 
thought to how the harassed woman would feel.
26
 The remarks are delivered by all races and clas-
ses of men, alone and in groups.
27
 Men will almost never harass a woman when she is with a 
man,
28
 suggesting that (1) harassers know that this type of comment is not a normal, friendly 
greeting; (2) harassers likely have more respect for men traversing in public spaces; and/or (3) the 
intended harm or fear is less likely to occur when another man is present. Without a reasonable 
restriction on this type of public harassment, it is hard to imagine eradicating gender-based crimes 
or sexual violence against women. 
I will focus on female victims for the purpose of this piece, though LGBTQ individuals 
are also targets of this behavior. A 2001 survey found that gay and transgender people suffer high 
rates of verbal and physical harassment in public spaces.
29
 One-half of LGBT respondents avoid 
                                                                
 23 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 2320, 2323 (1989). “The rise in hate crimes by minors is sad testimony to the spread of the racist message.” Id. at 
2332 n.70.  
 24 Heather Timmons & Sruthi Gottipati, Indian Women March: ‘That Girl Could Have Been Any 
One of Us,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/31/world/asia/rape-incites-
women-to-fight-culture-in-india.html. 
 25 Many women express that unsolicited comments such as “you should smile more” or “hold 
your head up, don’t be ashamed of your a**” represent an invasion of their body, tantamount to psychic rape. See MURIEL 
DIMEN, SURVIVING SEXUAL CONTRADICTIONS: A STARTLING AND DIFFERENT LOOK AT A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A 
CONTEMPORARY PROFESSIONAL WOMAN 3 (1986). See also Fatma El-Nahry, She’s Not Asking For It: Street Harassment 
and Women in Public Spaces, GENDER ACROSS BORDERS (March 20, 2012 3:00 PM), 
http://www.genderacrossborders.com/2012/03/20/shes-not-asking-for-it-street-harassment-and-women-in-public-spaces/. 
 26 WAR ZONE (Film Fatale Inc. 1998), available at  
http://www.snagfilms.com/films/title/war_zone. 
 27 Critics of potential criminal statutes prohibiting street harassment believe they would be dis-
proportionately enforced against communities of color. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal 
Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 551-52 (1993). A common criticism of the Hollaback! viral video had to 
do with the lack of Caucasian men among the harassers portrayed in the film. See, e.g., Hanna Rosin, The Problem With 
That Catcalling Video, SLATE.COM (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/10/29/catcalling_video_ 
hollaback_s_look_at_street_harassment_in_nyc_edited_out.html.  
 28 Meredith Napolitano, Just Looking: A View of Street Harassment of Women, THE VILLAGER 
(Aug. 3 – 9, 2005), http://thevillager.com/villager_118/justlookingaviewof.html.  
 29 EMPIRE STATE PRIDE AGENDA, ANTI-GAY/LESBIAN DISCRIMINATION IN NEW YORK STATE 3-4 
(May 2001) (on file with Author) (finding that more than fifty percent of LGBTQ respondents felt the need to conceal 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss5/1
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public places in the European Union (EU) and Croatia for fear of being assaulted, threatened, or 
harassed by others, according to a new study by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights.
30
 They 
overwhelmingly identified the “street, square, car parking lot/public place” as the most recent site 
of physical/sexual attack or threat.
31
 I hope the outcome of this project makes public places more 
welcoming for all. 
I. STREET HARASSMENT’S FIT WITH CURRENT LEGAL HARMS 
This Article identifies a range of behaviors that all properly fall under the general head-
ing of street harassment, but that may receive different treatments at law in different jurisdictions. 
As described above, street harassment exists on a continuous spectrum of behavior, from sexist 
and potentially threatening comments to more explicitly violent and obscene verbal and physical 
aggression, with corresponding degrees of intimidation. Some street harassment resembles the 
conduct prohibited by a number of current statutes and tort laws. Women who are harassed on the 
street could arguably proceed with a suit for assault, indecent exposure, an offense against public 
order, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the exercise of their civil 
rights. In fact, women who were sexually harassed in the workplace before Title VII was passed
32
 
attempted to sue under longstanding tort law, though recovery was generally denied.
33
 Some torts 
applicable to street harassment are discussed briefly below. However, very few cases deal with 
street harassment and even fewer convictions have been upheld.
34
 And underreporting is a prob-
lem, as is the case with many sexually-based offenses against women. Women are discouraged 
from bringing street harassment suits because of the futility of recovery: many offenders are tran-
sient or damage-proof, police are unlikely to take such crimes seriously,
35
 and precedent weighs 
against them. An analysis of the sparse case law suggests the obstacles preventing success in a 
courtroom include but is not limited to: 
(1) judicial reluctance to punish or impose liability for speech alone; 
(2) the pervasiveness of street harassment, which undermines its severity in the eyes of 
the law
36
 (though in other contexts ubiquity usually amplifies the need for a remedy); 
                                                                
their sexual orientation on the street out of fear of harassment). 
            30 Patrick McNeil, Half of LGBT Members of the EU Community Avoid Public Places Because of 
Harassment, STOP STREET HARASSMENT (May 17, 2013), http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/2013/05/eustudy/. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits unwelcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that is a condition of employment, used in employ-
ment decisions, or is meant to or does create a hostile work environment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e -2000e-17 (1988). 
 33 Michael D. Vhay, The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Har-
assment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 328, 328 (1998) (quoting Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of 
Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV 1033, 1055 (1936)). 
 34 Commonwealth v. Duncan, 363 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). 
 35 A woman who was harassed, threatened, and chased by a man on the street called the police. 
The dispatcher and officer who arrived on the scene were “nonchalant and unhelpful.” HOLLY KEARL, STOP STREET 
HARASSMENT: MAKING PUBLIC PLACES SAFE AND WELCOMING FOR WOMEN 49 (2010). 
 36 A dissenting judge in one of these rare convictions stated the court ran the risk of “criminaliz-
ing generally accepted behavior” because women are frequently harangued with catcalls and sexual requests. He also as-
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(3) reliance upon the “reasonable man” standard to judge the appropriateness of a listen-
er’s reaction; and/or 
(4) a requirement for repeated interactions with the harasser.
37
 
I will attack these reasons by illustrating the discriminatory application of the First 
Amendment and exposing how inappropriate the reasonable man standard is in these contexts. I 
will also suggest modifications to the legal regime and alternative social strategies to reduce the 
prevalence of street harassment. The torts discussed below only capture the problem in piecemeal: 
some instances of street harassment could be legal assaults, some could qualify for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, and others might fall under states’ definitions of indecent exposure 
or lewd and lascivious conduct. It is no accident that “no recognized legal category has been ap-
plied with any regularity to the entire fact pattern of sexual harassment,” a phenomenon Professor 
Catherine MacKinnon attributes to “the conceptual inadequacy of traditional legal theories to the 
social reality of men’s sexual treatment of women.”
38
 I argue that her insight applies to street har-
assment. 
That said, the most egregious instances of street harassment could and should be covered 
by some of these torts. Other incidents involving employees and common carriers could be pro-
scribed by civil liability in the same way Title VII prohibited the sexual harassment of women in 
the workplace. 
A. Example Statutes39 
New York’s criminal statute for harassment may provide a model law for other states: 
A person is guilty of harassment in the first degree when he or she intentionally 
and repeatedly harasses another person by following such person in or about a 
public place or places or by engaging in a course of conduct or by repeatedly 
committing acts which places such person in reasonable fear of physical inju-
ry.
40
 
One issue with this statute is that it appears to require repetition. One interpretation 
would be that the same individual would have to harass the victim multiple times. (Though the 
“repeatedly” associated with the third prong of harassing behavior (“committing acts”) seems 
oddly redundant with the initial requirement.) A Georgia statute prohibiting disorderly conduct 
                                                                
serted that the propositioning male did not violate the anti-harassment statute because women are frequently subjects of 
unwanted sexual propositions—though the statute itself only required the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another and a 
course of conduct that served no legitimate purpose. Duncan, 363 A.2d at 809 (Hoffman, J., dissenting). For the Pennsyl-
vania harassment statute, see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2709 (West). 
 37 States’ stalking (and some harassment) statutes require repeated instances of following. 
 38 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 161 (1979).  
 39 Other statutes that capture some street harassment conduct, e.g., stalking, open lewdness, and 
aggravated harassment, are included in the Appendix. A future research project could include a comprehensive survey of 
state and/or municipal laws potentially proscribing street harassment conduct. 
            40 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney). 
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provides another example: 
(a) A person commits the offense of disorderly conduct when such person 
commits any of the following: 
(1) Acts in a violent or tumultuous manner toward another person whereby such 
person is placed in reasonable fear of the safety of such person’s life, limb, or 
health . . . 
(3) Without provocation, uses to or of another person in such other person’s 
presence, opprobrious or abusive words which by their very utterance tend to 
incite to an immediate breach of the peace, that is to say, words which as a mat-
ter of common knowledge and under ordinary circumstances will, when used to 
or of another person in such other person’s presence, naturally tend to provoke 
violent resentment, that is, words commonly called “fighting words”; or 
(4) Without provocation, uses obscene and vulgar or profane language in the 
presence of or by telephone to a person under the age of 14 years which threat-
ens an immediate breach of the peace. 
(b) Any person who commits the offense of disorderly conduct shall be guilty of 
a misdemeanor.
41
 
Many instances of street harassment would be captured by the first prong (“[a]cts in a . . . 
tumultuous manner toward another person”). I will discuss the third prong, “fighting words,” infra 
Part II. Street harassment of girls under age 14 could be covered by the fourth prong. Note also 
that the Georgia statute has no intent requirement for the harasser. 
The Model Penal Code also provides provisions against harassment and disorderly con-
duct: 
A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass another, he: 
(1) makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate communication; or 
(2) insults, taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke violent or 
disorderly response; or 
(3) makes repeated communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient 
hours, or in offensively coarse language; or 
(4) subjects another to an offensive touching; or 
(5) engages in any other course of alarming conduct serving no legitimate pur-
pose of the actor.
42
 
                                                                
                   41 .GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-39 (West). 
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A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with purpose to cause public incon-
venience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
(a) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; or 
(b) makes unreasonable noise or offensively coarse utterance, gesture or dis-
play, or addresses abusive language to any person present; or 
(c) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which 
serves no legitimate purpose of the actor. 
“Public” means affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the pub-
lic or a substantial group has access; among the places included are highways, 
transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of business or 
amusement, or any neighborhood.
43
 
The fifth prong of the harassment provision and parts (b) and (c) of the disorderly con-
duct provision appear most helpful in preventing street harassment. The disorderly conduct statute 
also encompasses reckless, not just intentional, behavior. The “no legitimate purpose” phrase in 
both provisions may also aid in this project; remember that many men who were asked why they 
harass did not provide persuasive answers. Like the Georgia statute, some parts of the Model Pe-
nal Code use a similar “fighting words” test for speech that is proscribed harassment: words that 
would incite a reasonable person (read: man) to violence or a breach of the peace. My analysis in 
Part II will show that this standard is unacceptably gendered and must be reconceptualized to ex-
tend equal protections to women. I also suggest that “true threat” doctrine is a promising starting 
point to justify restrictions on this type of speech. 
1. Assault 
Statutes and courts define assault as placing in another the reasonable fear of imminent 
danger, and street harassment often meets this test.
44
 For example, comments such as “I would 
f**k you” or “I’m going to f**k you” provide a basis for a reasonable fear that rape might occur. 
Since the likelihood a woman will experience rape or attempted rape during her lifetime is 20 per-
cent to 25 percent, even without correction for underreporting,
45
 and approximately 22 percent of 
sexual violence is committed by a stranger,
46
 a reasonable woman (whether cognizant of those 
statistics or not) is and should be afraid when targeted and yelled at by a male stranger. Therefore, 
she would have a case for tortious assault. 
                                                                
            42 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4. 
           43 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2. 
 44 Nearly all street harassment anecdotes surveyed for this paper mention fear of physical harm 
as an immediate response. 
            45 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 14. 
 46 Press Release, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Over 60 Percent Decline in Sexual Violence 
Against Females from 1995 to 2010 (March 7, 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/fvsv9410pr.cfm.  
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 2. Indecent Exposure 
Like the example described in the introduction, some street harassment situations include 
exposure of the harasser’s genitals. In most states, exposure of the genitals in a public place is a 
criminal offense punishable by fines, imprisonment, and/or sex offender registrations and re-
strictions. In other states, simple nudity is legal but intent to shock, arouse, or offend others may 
make the conduct prohibited. One could argue that if genitalia are exposed during a street harass-
ment incident, as when some men publicly masturbate while watching women walk past, intent to 
shock, arouse, or offend the harassed is arguably present. And the words that often accompany 
these actions are further evidence of intent to do at least one if not more of those things. 
3. False Imprisonment 
False imprisonment, an intentional tort, is the “unlawful restraint by one person of the 
physical liberty of another.”
47
 Prominent jurist Sir William Blackstone stated, “[e]very confine-
ment of a person is an imprisonment . . . even by forcibly detaining one in the public street.”
48
 
Numerous women report having their path intentionally blocked by street harassers: for instance, 
where a man (or a group of them) stands directly in a woman’s path or corners her in a bus or a 
subway car. Some states, such as Connecticut, say that “[a]ny period of restraint, no matter how 
brief in duration, is sufficient to constitute a basis for liability.”
49
 Some street harassment offend-
ers could be prosecuted under false imprisonment without dealing with any aspects of sexual in-
tent (e.g., whether the advance was “unwanted”), which many courts are ill equipped to do. In 
fact, courts have found false imprisonment elements to be separate from verbal sexual harassment 
in workplace and employment cases. For example, a woman alleged that her manager “confined 
her in a walk-in cooler where he made sexual advances toward her.”
50
 A court could then deal 
with that allegation separately, asking only whether someone intentionally confined someone else 
and ending the inquiry there. This is perhaps another aperture into combating street harassment. 
 4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Women harassed on the street could obtain redress through the civil remedy of intention-
al infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). The Second Restatement of Torts reads “[o]ne who by 
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to 
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results 
from it, for such bodily harm.”
51
 As one author noted, “[i]n most states, the tort of [IIED] requires 
three elements: the conduct must 1) be extreme and outrageous; 2) be intentional or reckless; and 
3) cause severe emotional distress.”
52
 Furthermore, “[i]n the words of the Restatement, ‘[t]he lia-
                                                                
 47 4 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 41:1 (2d ed.). 
 48 Id. (citing 3 Bl. Comm. 127 (1790)). 
 49 14 CONN. PRAC., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2:4. 
 50 Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 22 (1997). 
 51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
 52 Clay Mahaffey, Case Note, Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337 (Wyo. 1997), 33 LAND & 
WATER L. REV. 731, 737-38 (1998). 
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bility clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, 
or other trivialities.’”
53
 
As discussed supra Part I, courts have difficulty determining whether instances of street 
harassment are “extreme and outrageous” since the conduct is so pervasive. But some sexual har-
assment cases indicate leeway to erode this standard based upon a subjective and community-
based assessment of outrageous conduct instead of an amateur estimate of how common it is. The 
Wyoming Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s finding that a coworker’s sexual misconduct 
(staring, touching, hugging, following, and rubbing a coworker’s leg with his crotch) was not out-
rageous enough to present to a jury. The Wyoming court determined instead that such misconduct 
could be considered “outrageous” enough to give rise to a claim of IIED.
54
 Even under a stricter 
standard for civil remedies—such as the Third Circuit’s requirement that there be a “plus factor” 
of retaliation (some sort of professional harm, for example) for turning down sexual propositions 
in the employment context
55
 for an IIED claim—some instances of street harassment would be 
illegal. For instance, many women report verbal and behavioral escalation after initial harassing 
words are ignored, such as following, confinement, groping, or threats. Those could count as re-
taliatory measures. 
Victims of street harassment have reported the severe emotional distress required by 
courts. Emotional distress includes “all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, 
grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea.”
56
 
Plaintiffs in employment sexual harassment cases have prevailed in IIED cases by showing diag-
noses for post-traumatic stress disorder associated with the incidents.
57
 A vast majority of female 
victims of sexual violence, rape, or stalking report symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.
58
 
Women who are harassed on the street report severe feelings of distress, depression, and fear, not 
only immediately after the harassment but also sometimes lasting for weeks or months.
59
 Many 
women blog about being afraid to step outside, avoiding public places, and becoming more and 
more introverted as a result of being harassed on the street.
60
 Repeat harassment is likely even 
more distressing, and the street harassment of rape and sexual assault survivors could be devastat-
ing to their psychological well-being. 
5. Punishable Violations of Others’ Civil Rights 
Street harassment arguably curbs women’s right to travel in public spaces. Though the 
                                                                
 53 Id. at 738 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)). 
 54 Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1339-41, 1343, 1345 (Wyo. 1997). 
 55 See Lang v. Seiko Instruments USA, Inc., No. 96-5398, 1997 WL 11301 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
14, 1997) (citing Third Circuit and district court cases). 
 56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965). 
 57 See, e.g., Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1340. 
 58 NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 14, at 56. 
            59 STOP STREET HARASSMENT, UNSAFE AND HARASSED IN PUBLIC SPACES: A NATIONAL STREET 
HARASSMENT REPORT 5 (2014), available at http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2014-
National-SSH-Street-Harassment-Report.pdf.  
            60 Id. at 47. 
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Supreme Court has never directly considered a right to intrastate travel,
61
 some courts have found 
one, stating: “[t]he constitutional right to travel between states implies a correlative constitutional 
right to travel within a state, and the right of intramunicipal travel, as a basic human right.”
62
 
Women already report limiting their travel and restricting their public movements to protect 
themselves,
63
 avoiding construction sites and bus stops or switching subway cars. Therefore, un-
der the following California statute, some forms of street harassment could be punished as “intim-
idating” women in the “free exercise or enjoyment” of their right to travel in certain public places 
on the basis of gender, a “perceived characteristic[]”: 
No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or threat of force, 
willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in the free exer-
cise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of 
this state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States in whole or in part because of one or 
more of the actual or perceived characteristics of the victim listed in subdivision (a) of Section 
422.55.
64
 
B. Summary 
Some forms of street harassment are generally prohibited by the statutes and ordinances 
discussed above (even if the law is not properly enforced specifically in street harassment situa-
tions or at all), while some forms remain permitted. For example, the frequent and insidious ad-
monition for women to “smile more” is probably currently legal. And even when street harass-
ment cases come before courts as violations of current law, new interpretations are necessary to 
extend the law’s protection to victims. Statutes prohibiting harassment such as “smile more” 
would be novel, and are likely to be challenged on First Amendment grounds. However, I argue 
in the next Part that the First Amendment is not necessarily at odds with statutes that would ban 
speech-only versions of street harassment, because such prohibitions could fit into the “true 
threat” exception to First Amendment protection. 
Similar to laws prohibiting obscenity and incitement, laws against “true threats” enjoy 
exceptional protection from First Amendment scrutiny because of their special public purposes. 
But slightly different issues are raised by the “true threats” doctrine. Laws against true threats, as 
explained in one seminal Supreme Court case, are enacted to protect individuals from the coer-
cion engendered by threats of physical violence and the fear that such threats engender,
65
 whereas 
laws against incitement are enacted to prevent public disorder and conflict.
66
 Laws against cross-
                                                                
 61 Andrew C. Porter, Comment, Toward A Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intrastate 
Travel, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 820, 828 (1992). 
 62 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 220 & nn. 7, 8. 
 63 See Barbara Krahé, Cognitive Coping with the Threat of Rape: Vigilance and Cognitive 
Avoidance, 73 J. PERSONALITY 609 (2005) (discussing studies of women’s rape-preventative behaviors). 
             64 CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6(a) (West 2014). 
             65 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388-89 (1992) (explaining why threats of violence 
fall outside the First Amendment’s protection). 
             66 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (stating that punishment of 
words that “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” does not raise Consti-
tutional problems). 
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burning as a form of intimidation, for example, need not be justified on the grounds that the activ-
ity is likely to lead to retaliatory violence; rather, the act of cross-burning reveals a hateful inten-
tion to place another in mortal fear.
67
 It is therefore illegal. However, an exploration of the gen-
dered origins of the First Amendment incitement doctrine can help explain why street harassment 
remains uncaptured by “fighting words” and can assist us in anticipating difficulties in applying 
even the “true threat” doctrine. But perhaps the undertones in some of the “true threat” cases, in-
cluding a special concern about race-based violence, provide hope that prevention of gender-
based violence may legitimately motivate prohibitions against “true threats” targeted towards 
women, making up for the ground lost by the “fighting words” doctrine. 
II. THE GENDERED FIRST AMENDMENT 
Critics allege criminalizing or holding people liable for street harassment threatens to 
chill freedom of expression—this country’s prize right.
68
 However, I argue that the legal tradition 
of the First Amendment is deeply and unfairly rooted in a male-dominated conception of public 
spaces and therefore does not recognize the harms inflicted on women from street harassment. I 
will support this generalization through two specific examples: the “fighting words” doctrine and 
the homosexual advance defense. Freedom of speech is not absolute—public speech men perceive 
as harmful is protected whereas words that harm women are not. This is because “reasonable” 
women typically do not—and cannot, for physical safety reasons—respond to insult or injury with 
explosive violence. I will also suggest an aperture into First Amendment protection for street har-
assment using the “true threat” doctrine, which does not require a violent response from the lis-
tener in order to justify proscription. 
The American commitment to free speech has never been universal. As Professor Mari 
Matsuda states, “[t]he American doctrine recognizes a few limited categories of speech that take 
on qualities beyond expression.”
69
 Perjury, extortion, conspiracy, and false warranties are pun-
ished, despite being purely speech.
70
 Courts have subordinated our commitment to free speech in 
favor of national security, “functioning of government,” public safety and order, privacy, reputa-
tion, and decency.
71
 
The priority of public safety and order, as it is currently applied, only protects speech 
harmful to the male half of the population. The “fighting words” doctrine
72
 provides that words 
that are likely to bring the average recipient—a man—to blows are unprotected by the First 
Amendment. The Supreme Court defined such speech as words “which by their very utterance 
                                                                
                67 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003) (finding that cross-burning carried out with 
the intent to intimidate may be banned). 
             68 E.g., Gabe Rottman, Legislating Catcalling Comes with Real Risks, ACLU (Oct. 31, 2014, 
12:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/legislating-catcalling-comes-real-risks?redirect=blog/speakeasy/legislating-
catcalling-comes-real-risks.  
 69 Matsuda, supra note 23, at 2351. 
 70 Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. 
REV. 265, 270-71 (1981). 
           71 Matsuda, supra note 23, at 2355. 
 72 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (noting limited classes of unprotected speech, including 
insults that provoke violence). 
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inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”
73
 Also included are “threatening, 
profane, or obscene revilings.”
74
 By definition, the “fighting words” doctrine privileges male re-
sponses to verbal harassment and leaves women unprotected. Words that “incite” a breach of the 
peace are probably only spoken to men, since they are the ones most likely to react with explosive 
and disruptive violence. This doctrine is rooted in a boy-and man-centric conception of the public 
street, where they yell at each other and fight. Women, for a number of reasons, including an em-
inently reasonable fear of retaliation and physical harm, are unlikely to “breach the peace” after 
even the most obscene, offensive, or harmful insults. 
Street harassment, much of which is just as offensive as other “fighting words,”
75
 re-
mains permissible because of mere differences in average size and aggression between the gen-
ders. Many women report feeling enraged, angry, and infuriated after such encounters. But be-
cause street harassment does not occur with two persons of equal power, the reaction of an 
average woman is flight rather than fight: avoiding eye contact, walking faster, or leaving the lo-
cation entirely. This is a reasonable, self-preserving reaction, given the prevalence of sexual vio-
lence and the intuitive connection between verbal and physical assault. Women who respond to 
the offensive words verbally at all, even politely, say the harassment can quickly escalate to vio-
lence.
76
 Even those who do not respond are also met with violence.
77
 It is absurd to imagine a fe-
male victim throwing a punch in response to a male stranger’s harassment, no matter how sexual-
ly explicit and offensive his comments are. In addition to the size difference between the average 
man and average woman, street harassment often occurs with multiple men and one woman tar-
get, where initiating a fight would be highly irrational from her perspective. Therefore, a woman’s 
fear, desire to keep the peace, or self-restraint, however sensible or noble, means these words are 
coded as legally inactionable. In other words, the lack of violent responses from harassed women 
excludes them from the potential protection from speech categorized as an incitement to violence 
or a disturbance of the peace. The “fighting words” men utter at women on the street are sufficient 
to incite in them a very real (and reasonable) fear of physical violence—a “fight” they would like-
ly lose—but do not inspire them to escalate the conflict. 
Another example of the legal privilege given to male explosive violence is the “homo-
sexual advance defense.” The law treats unwanted sexual advances upon men very differently 
than unwanted sexual advances upon women: targeted men could use the defense to reduce a 
charge of murder, but the law did not recognize an equivalent for women. The “homosexual ad-
vance defense” appeared in courts starting in 1967 and allowed (male) defendants to raise homo-
sexual panic as an insanity defense to homicide prosecutions.
78
 Though it is no longer recognized 
                                                                
 73 Id. at 572.  
 74 Id. at 573. 
 75 The Court determined that “damn racketeer” and “damn Fascist” were fighting words. Id. at 
574. 
 76 For example, a woman told a harassing man to “please leave [her] alone” on the Metro. 
Stranger on a Train: ‘I Would Fucking Kill You Bitch’, JEZEBEL (Sept. 9, 2012 6:30 PM), 
http://jezebel.com/5941463/stranger-on-a-train-i-would-fucking-kill-you-bitch. He then punched the walls and doors of the 
train and stared at her face while screaming, “IF I HAD A GUN I’D SHOOT YOU” and “I WOULD FUCKING KILL 
YOU BITCH” in her face. Id. 
 77 Niki’s Story: When Her Street Harassing Stalker Escalated to Physical Violence, She Had to 
Involve the Police and Court System for Protection, HOLLABACK! (Jan. 21, 2013, 5:11 PM), (on file with the author).  
 78 Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 491 (2008). 
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in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
and is no longer a full defense, vestiges persist.
79
 Some courts have allowed mere words and a 
non-violent act from one man to another to reduce a charge of murder.
80
 On the other hand, un-
wanted sexual advances toward women are only legally recognized in certain settings, such as the 
workplace, and many of those cases are ultimately unsuccessful. Even when the unwanted sexual 
advance is factually similar to those in homosexual advance defense cases, courts refuse to rule in 
the woman’s favor or recognize the initiator’s conduct as legally significant.
81
 It appears unwant-
ed sexual advances upon women must meet a higher threshold before they are sufficient to pro-
vide their recipients with redress or legal recognition—perhaps in part because women do not 
usually respond with violence. 
Even if women did respond to street harassment and unwanted sexual advances with vio-
lence, courts might not respond favorably. For example, in 2006, seven black lesbians in Green-
wich Village were sexually propositioned by a man who followed them down the street, yelling 
obscene remarks and grabbing his genitals.
82
 When the women confronted him, he threw a ciga-
rette and spat on them.
83
 A physical altercation followed, during which a woman stabbed and in-
jured him.
84
 The sentencing judge identified the women as the aggressors because the man had 
just been uttering words beforehand, and maintained that the women should have walked away 
from the situation.
85
 Harassed women are faced with a lose-lose situation; even though the 
“fighting words” doctrine punishes women for reacting without violence, courts may still be un-
forgiving in the rare instances where women are unafraid to use force. Nevertheless, this case 
supports the idea that street harassment may be “fighting words,” as the intended targets were in-
cited to violence. 
The “true threats” doctrine, which is related but not identical to the “fighting words” doc-
trine,
86
 may be a powerful First Amendment exception to combat street harassment
87
 for a few 
                                                                
 79 “Though it is no longer the basis for a full defense, aggressors who introduce evidence of a 
homosexual advance have successfully claimed provocation, ultimately achieving some mitigation of their murder charg-
es.” Kavita B. Ramakrishnan, Inconsistent Legal Treatment of Unwanted Sexual Advances: A Study of Homosexual Ad-
vance Defense, Street Harassment, and Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 291, 
306 (2013) (citing Developments in the Law—Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1546 (1989)). 
 80 In Mills v. Shepherd, the defendant voluntarily accompanied the victim to a cove after the vic-
tim offered him $20 to commit a homosexual act. 445 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (W.D.N.C. 1978). The victim grabbed the de-
fendant’s privates and made a pass at him, after which the defendant pushed him out of the car, chased, and then kicked 
him to death. Id. The trial court allowed jury instruction for voluntary manslaughter and the defendant was convicted of 
this lesser charge. Id. 
 81 See, e.g., Meriwether v. Carauster Packaging Co., 326 F.3d 990, 992-93 (8th Cir. 2003) (find-
ing that a plaintiff did not demonstrate “severe or pervasive” harassment where her co-worker grabbed her buttock “with 
force, not merely a pinch, but a hold near her upper thigh”). 
            82 Laura S. Logan, The Case of the “Killer Lesbians,” THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL (Jul. 18, 
2011), http://thepublicintellectual.org/2011/07/18/the-case-of-the-killer-lesbians/. 
            83 Id. 
            84 Anemona Hartocollis, Four Women Are Sentenced in Attack on Man in Village, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/nyregion/15attack.html?ref=nyregion. 
 85 Id. 
 86 The Supreme Court stated that threats of violence are outside of First Amendment protection. 
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reasons: (a) there is no expectation of a violent response from the listener; (b) some courts do not 
substitute the “reasonable man” for the “reasonable listener;” (c) pervasiveness of the conduct 
matters less (an “extreme and outrageous” requirement is not directly written into some statutes); 
and d) the jurisprudence is relatively undeveloped and unentrenched. The exact boundaries of the 
“true threat” doctrine remain open, as “even though the Supreme Court has made clear that true 
threats are punishable, it has not clearly defined what speech constitutes a true threat.”
88
 The 
Court suggested a few factors for courts to consider, but no rule exists and no subsequent Su-
preme Court case has elaborated upon them. They are: “(1) whether or not the speech constitutes 
political hyperbole; (2) the overall context in which the statement is made; (3) the reaction of the 
listeners; and (4) whether or not the statement was conditional, especially if it was conditional on 
an event that was unlikely to occur.”
89
 
Street harassment could be a true threat, according to those factors. The Supreme Court 
has found that specific categories of speech do not warrant First Amendment protection because 
they are “of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
[them] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”
90
 The Court is especial-
ly hesitant to restrict political speech, as evidenced by the first factor in the list. But among the 
hundreds of verbal ejaculations hurled at women that I read for this Article, I did not find one that 
contained political content or ideas.
91
 Potentially threatening speech protected by the Constitution 
has included content decidedly more political or ideological in nature than sexually explicit com-
ments.
92
 Even unlike the words in some other threat cases, street harassment utterances have no 
expressive idea value. Thus, suppressing street harassment would not mean the suppression of 
ideas with social value or political significance.
93
 In addition, usually only the target or a handful 
of people hears the harassment; it does not and is not meant to reach a broad audience or the 
community at-large. The context of the statement is not a political rally or a demonstration, it is 
usually made to a woman walking alone. Further, men who harass do not intend to start a dialog 
                                                                
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (listing the reason as “protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear 
engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur”). 
 87 Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity, True Threats, and the First Amendment, 36 CONN. L. REV. 
541, 547 (2004) (“Over the course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has declared in several cases that true 
threats remain beyond the circle of protected speech under the First Amendment.”). 
 88 Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 
288 (2001). Other courts have determined that true threats are punishable as well. See, e.g., United States v. Kelner, 534 
F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that penalizing specific threats of physical injury is a valid aspect of government’s 
“constitutional responsibility to ensure domestic tranquility”). See also California v. Mirmirani, 636 P.2d 1130, 1138 n.10 
(Ca. 1981) (“Although the Legislature may constitutionally penalize threats, even though they are pure speech, statutes 
which attempt to do so must be narrowly directed only to threats which truly pose a danger to society.”). 
 89 Rothman, supra note 88, at 295; see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per 
curiam) (finding a statute punishing threats to the life of the president to be “constitutional on its face”).  
 90 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
            91 See sources cited supra note 7. 
            92 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 706-08. 
 93 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court prohibited a restriction on speech because it was a broad 
restriction on the expression of racist or sexist ideas. To be valid, the Court noted, the restriction would have to be based 
on the mode of expression, rather than the content. 505 U.S. at 393-94.  
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with their targets. Professor Laurence Tribe writes: “[i]t is not plausible to uphold the right to use  
words as projectiles where no exchange of views is involved.”
94
 Not only does street harassment 
exist outside the political, intellectual, and ideological discourse of society, but it also lacks any 
redeeming social, literary, or artistic value.
95
 A Tumblr site found no women who enjoyed the at-
tention of street harassers.
96
 Some men who harass women on the street say they do it for fun or 
out of boredom.
97
 No men interviewed on the street said they wanted to advance an ideological or 
political agenda or begin a meaningful discussion about gender and male-female relationships. 
Even if some men who street-harass intend to convey an idea, the expressive value is far 
outweighed by women’s interests in physical safety and their right to be present in public spaces. 
Arguably, some men intend to convey that women in public are available to them (almost like 
property) and can be objectified without consequence. The rationale for exempting true threats 
from First Amendment protection may give powerful hope to those who want legislation against 
street harassment. According to the Supreme Court, there are at least three justifications for the 
“true threats” doctrine: “(1) to protect people from the fear of violence; (2) to prevent the disrup-
tion that this fear engenders; (3) to incarcerate people who have identified themselves as likely to 
carry out a threatened crime before they have the opportunity to perpetrate the crime.”
98
 The first 
two do the most work against street harassment. Studies and my survey of anecdotes for this pa-
per indicate fear, sometimes debilitating, is a nearly universal (and reasonable) reaction to street 
harassment. Even when harassment occurs in a public place or during the daytime, it could easily 
escalate into violence, or the offender could follow the woman until she is alone and harm her. 
With example after example of harassment escalating into physical violence or stalking in highly-
trafficked areas during peak travel hours, it is hard to identify a safe or harmless context for street 
harassment. Women have no way of knowing whether a particular interaction will become vio-
lent, and there is always a significant possibility that it will.
99
 Therefore, fear is a reasonable re-
sponse for most women during and after most instances of street harassment. 
In addition to the original fear the harassment engenders, it causes a significant disrup-
tion in the individual woman’s life: many women pay a psychic fear tax. As mentioned earlier, 
harassed women avoid going outside and making eye contact, undergo psychological counseling, 
and sometimes even stop working.
100
 Furthermore, given the high incidence in the population of 
                                                                
 94 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8 (2d ed. 1988). See also Kent 
Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 293 (1990) (calling such words 
“psychic assault”). 
 95 “Other areas of the law, such as obscenity law, allow speech to be protected not only if it has 
serious political value, but also if it has literary, social, or artistic value.” Rothman, supra note 88, at 330.  
 96 How Many Women Find Street Harassment Flattering?, TUMBLR, 
http://howmanywomen.tumblr.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
 97 Kearl, supra note 35, at 132. 
 98 Rothman, supra note 88, at 290-91 (noting four reasons); see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388. The Su-
preme Court has also held that prohibiting a particular “subset of intimidating messages” was permissible because it was 
among “those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm,” and thus “‘consiste[d] entirely of 
the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.’” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. at 361-63 (quoting R.A.V., 
505 U.S. at 388). 
 99 “Now I view all gestures from men on the street as potential threats.” Emily Bernard, Black 
Women and the Backwash of Harassment, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1990, at C8. 
 100 See, e.g., Kathryn Stamoulis, “Hey Baby” Hurts: The Psychological Implications of Street 
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female victims of sexual assault and rape, street harassment can exacerbate previous pain, causing 
an even larger disruption. Protecting half the population from the fear of violence and protecting 
individuals and our society from this type of disruption is arguably important enough to curtail 
some speech that lacks redeeming social value.
101
 
The flexibility of the “true threat” intent requirement may allow for broader prosecution 
of street harassment. In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court plurality did not require that the 
speaker intend to carry out the threat,
102
 but the Court’s minimal guidance on this issue means cir-
cuit courts vary in their attention to the speaker’s intent. Most do not require an intent to threaten, 
though “[s]ome judges on the Ninth and Fourth Circuits think that courts and juries should, in cer-
tain circumstances, consider the speaker’s intent,” and the Second Circuit requires imminence.
103
 
Many instances of street harassment would pass even those stricter tests; at least fifteen percent of 
men in one survey intended to demonstrate power over their targets,
104
 arguably equivalent to an 
intent to threaten. In addition, some also harass with the intent to choose rape victims.
105
 
Rather than limitations on street harassment working against First Amendment interests, 
the true spirit of the First Amendment can be a useful tool in this project. The street is the apex of 
the polity and First Amendment rights—the site of public movement, visibility, and speech. It is a 
powerful place. But it has historically been a very male-oriented space, from childhood onward. 
Whether boys are playing kickball in the street or men are leaning against a fence, the street is 
dominated by their words and actions. Current laws structuring public life, including the excep-
tions to First Amendment protections, privilege traditionally male behavior and communication. 
Pervasive street harassment limits women from entering public spaces and participating fully in 
public life due to both actual and expected hostility. There are even economic consequences; 
women take cabs instead of public transportation, take the longer route to work and miss out on 
hourly wages, or pay gym fees and buy home exercise equipment because they cannot run out-
side. The state’s refusal to recognize these harms results in a double-injury; women are dispropor-
tionately harmed by speech in the street and then not compensated for it by the state in the same 
ways that men are. 
Professor Catherine MacKinnon channels Hobbes to argue for state intervention in order 
to protect women from private harm in private places.
106
 I argue state intervention is necessary to 
protect women from private harm in public places. Today’s streets are remnants of the untamed 
                                                                
Harassment, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-new-teen-age/201108/hey-
baby-hurts (describing a teenager’s change in behavior resulting from street harassment); see Fairchild & Rudman, supra 
note 18, at 341-42, 354 (discussing the link between sexual harassment and decline in physical well-being and restriction 
of movement, and finding that stranger harassment can result in similar negative effects). 
 101 An intersection of “true threat” doctrine with obscenity or explicitly offensive speech may 
work to take a chunk out of the problem—perhaps the most extreme or vulgar comments could be more easily prosecuted 
as well. See Elisabeth Muckala, Speech Prohibition: How Far Is Too Far? The First Amendment Implications of Virginia 
v. Black, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 397, 400 (2005).  
 102 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003). 
 103 Rothman, supra note 88, at 302. 
 104 Kearl, supra note 35, at 131-32.  
 105 See Kearl, supra note 13, and accompanying text. 
 106 See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 161 
(1989). 
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Hobbesian state of nature for women: nasty, brutish, and with the fear of violence ever-present: a 
modern war zone. This is unacceptable in a modern society. Restricting street harassment will 
serve the ends of the First Amendment in allowing and encouraging women to fully contribute 
their voices in all spaces, public and private. As scholar Jennifer Elrod states, “[t]rue threats are 
the antithesis of the speech clause’s central principle that favors wide-ranging, robust debate and 
discussion of a broad variety of subject matter.”
107
 Indeed, that central principle supports legal ac-
tion against street harassment. Creating public discourse is not always passive; for example, pre-
serving freedom of expression once meant court-ordered police escorts for the Ku Klux Klan to 
prevent public interference with their demonstration.
108
 By restricting street harassment, a catego-
ry of utterances with very low or nonexistent social value, women will be able to participate more 
fully in public debate, express themselves, access public resources, and travel freely. The fabric of 
public life—the actual debates on public policy, community causes, and the economy—will be 
richer with more voices. 
III. PROPOSED REMEDIES 
I will outline both legal and non-legal solutions to this problem. Though the list is by no 
means exhaustive, the goal is to remove slices of the pie chart that represents all street harass-
ment. If we can reduce the prevalence of street harassment, the likelihood that courts will view the 
conduct as “extreme and outrageous” within their jurisdictions increases. 
A. Legal Strategies 
A piece of legislation like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act could provide a starting point 
for legal remedies, including tort small claims against a) any corporation whose employees are on 
the street in the performance of their job duties and harass women and b) common carriers, who 
owe a higher duty of care to their passengers. Small claims court could quickly resolve these is-
sues (especially with new video technology allowing for recordings of these incidents). I suggest 
that venue only for expediency and to avoid the more stringent requirements for criminal penal-
ties, but certainly not to trivialize the harms from street harassment. Once the prevalence decreas-
es, perhaps courts will be more willing to see the conduct as intolerable and worthy of penalty. 
Company plaintiffs may be more efficacious, since they solve significant problems with 
typical individual offenders, including anonymity, mobility, and lack of income. The tort would 
encompass corporations whose employees work on or use the street in the performance of their 
occupational duties: for example, construction companies, building cleaners, trucking companies, 
and delivery services.
109
 I envision a sanitized “construction place.” The regime could draw di-
rectly from Title VII’s “hostile environment” principles: unwelcome sexual conduct that creates a 
hostile, intimidating, or offensive situation.
110
 Though that legislation does not currently apply to 
non-employees outside the workplace, it could provide a framework for liability to protect women 
                                                                
 107 Elrod, supra note 87, at 547. 
 108 80 A.L.R. 5th 255 (originally published in 2000). 
 109 Anecdotes indicate truck drivers frequently harass women in cars and on the street, and recent 
news articles show taxicabs are another common venue. Construction sites are “perennial problems.” Bowman, surpa note 
20, at 529. 
 110 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991). 
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harassed by “men at work.” My proposal could be an amendment to Title VII or a separate statue 
modeled off its framework. The statutory language could read: 
Verbal utterances or physical gestures of a gender-specific sexual nature di-
rected at consumers or passers-by from employees working in or traversing 
through public places or employees of common carriers during the performance 
of their job duties which could cause a reasonable fear of bodily injury or harm 
in a person of any gender are prohibited. 
To trigger employer liability under the statute, the harassment must occur while the har-
asser is acting in his capacity as employee and is in a public place. For instance, the harassing 
conduct of a construction worker walking home after his work shift would not fall under the stat-
ute. But liability would not be limited to harassment originating at the construction site; a con-
struction worker running an errand related to the job during his shift—picking up plywood from a 
supplier, for example—would be responsible (as would his employer) for any of his harassing 
conduct that occurred in public. 
After meeting that initial test, employers would be vicariously liable for the street har-
assment of their employees if they (a) failed to tell their workers initially that conduct was unac-
ceptable during training or other corporate introduction, (b) lacked a reporting/complaint mecha-
nism, or (c) failed to take post-complaint remedial action. Many companies already have internal 
reporting mechanisms in place created by Title VII, so marginal costs to the business may be 
small. Complying with section (b) could be as easy as adding a phone number for a reporting hot-
line to the corporation’s advertisement at a construction site. This proposal also leverages the cor-
poration’s profit interest. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission collected $52.3 mil-
lion in penalties for sexual harassment violations in fiscal year 2011.
111
 A 1988 survey suggested 
that sexual harassment costs the typical Fortune 500 company $6.7 million annually due to losses 
in employee productivity, not including damage awards and litigation costs.
112
 The possibility that 
these costs could increase by even a fraction may incentivize a company to properly train their 
public-facing employees. In addition, many businesses value potential customer and community 
goodwill.
113
 
The victim of harassment could sue the employee and employer for compensatory and 
punitive damages. Compensatory damages would pay victims for “out-of-pocket expenses” (e.g., 
any psychological counseling sought) and also for emotional harm suffered (“such as mental an-
guish, inconvenience, or loss of enjoyment of life”).
114
 The court could also award punitive dam-
                                                                
 111 Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997-FY 2011, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment.cfm (last visited May 
20, 2013). 
 112 FREADA KLEIN, KLEIN ASSOC., THE 1988 WORKING WOMAN SURVEY REPORT:  EXECUTIVE 
REPORT 2 (1988). 
 113 See Reporting Harassers, STOP STREET HARASSMENT, 
 http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/strategies/reporting/ (last visited May 21, 2013) (arguing that businesses “will not 
want employees harassing potential customers” or having their business get a bad reputation). 
 114 Remedies for Employment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/remedies.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
SHAH_OPEN SEASON_FORMATTED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/7/2016  3:53 PM 
398 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 18.5 
ages to punish an individual or employer for “especially malicious” acts.
115
 In addition, the court 
could require the employer to improve employee training or monitoring mechanisms to stop such 
conduct in the future. As under Title VII, there could be limits on compensatory and punitive 
damages based on employer size to assuage concerns about the impact on small businesses.
116
 
Public transportation is another common site for street harassment. Seventy-two percent 
of Bay Area respondents believed sexual harassment and assaults on public transportation were a 
problem.
117
 Both Japanese and Brazilian governments segregated subway riders by gender in 
2005 and 2006 to shield women from unwanted sexual behavior.
118
 Remedies against both pri-
vate
119
 transportation firms and municipal common carriers may allow victims to more easily ob-
tain redress. Courts characterize the duty to passengers as the “highest duty of care,” “extraordi-
nary diligence,” or the “utmost care and diligence.”
120
 Carriers can include buses, subways, taxis, 
escalators, ferries, toll bridges, ships, elevators, and even ski lifts.
121
 Women who are harassed by 
transit employees or even by other riders could sue if the employees have been negligent or reck-
less in their protection of passengers. Indeed, some courts have held that the higher duty of com-
mon carriers applies to assault or battery or other harms committed by a fellow passenger.
122
 In 
many relevant anecdotes, women are harassed on public buses and trains in front of conductors, 
who take no action (e.g., removing or reporting the harasser). Some women even report being 
harassed by the conductors themselves.
123
 Such a regime for public transportation could prevent 
such scenarios from occurring through deterrence and, at the very least, compensate victims. 
Some major municipal transportation authorities–such as DC’s WMATA and Philadelphia’s 
SEPTA–have paired with anti-street harassment organizations for public service announcements, 
indicating that common carriers are beginning to recognize that a problem exists.
124
 
New technology can assist in bringing these suits. For example, camera phones or mobile 
video can more easily document instances of harassment and identify harassers. Bystanders can 
                                                                
             115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Zusha Elinson & Shane Shiflett, Why Transit Riders Don’t Report Unwanted Sexual Behav-
ior, THE BAY CITIZEN, Feb. 29, 2012, https://www.baycitizen.org/news/transportation/why-transit-riders-dont-report-
unwanted/.  
 118 Fairchild & Rudman, supra note 18, at 341. 
 119 Some jurisdictions exclude private carriers from the higher standard of care. See 73 A.L.R. 2d 
346 (originally published in 1960). 
            120 1 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 3:55 (2d ed.). 
 121 Id. at § 3:56 (2d ed.) (citations omitted). 
 122 See, e.g., Todd v. Mass Transit Admin., 816 A.2d 930, 934-937 (Md. 2003). 
             123 Emma G. Gallegos, Women Share Their Stories of Sexual Harassment (and Worse) on Public 
Transportation, LAIST (Sept. 16, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://laist.com/2012/09/16/harassment.php.  
 124 See Jenice Armstrong, Tired of hearing catcalls? Hollaback!, THE PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 
  18, 2013, http://articles.philly.com/2013-04-18/news/38619217_1_septa-trains-street-harassment-new-ad-
campaign (highlighting an advertisement campaign on street harassment that debuted on Philadelphia SEPTA trains in 
April 2013); Holly Kearl, Meeting with WMATA to talk next steps in harassment campaign, STOP STREET HARASSMENT 
(Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/2015/03/wmatamarchmtg/. 
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collect evidence in cases where victims feel their safety would be threatened by taking photos or 
video. Cell phone photos and videos are admissible in civil courts
125
—for example, people can 
currently obtain a temporary restraining order with a cell phone video. 
Again, though harassment by employees on the street and on common carriers is only 
part of the problem, eliminating these instances could be the first legal steps. If this strategy re-
duces the behavior’s prevalence, judges may have a harder time asserting the conduct is “com-
monplace” and therefore should not be prohibited or criminalized. 
B. Social Movement 
A second, non-legal strategy using on-the-ground mobilization could also serve this goal. 
Through raising public awareness and engaging individuals in community debate, the incidence 
of street harassment may go down even further. A few women who stood up to their harassers re-
ported positive behavior change. For example, a street harasser whose catcalls were ignored fol-
lowed a woman down the street and accused her of being prejudiced (he was black and she was 
white).
126
 She answered yes, but explained that she was only biased “against men who stand on 
street corners shouting at women.”
127
 The woman recalled, “[h]is shocked expression changed to 
one of thoughtfulness and as he turned away he said, ‘I’m going to think about what you just 
said.’”
128
 Technology can be leveraged as part of the social movement as well; cell phone camer-
as, videos, and social networking sites allow people to upload photos in real-time. Women could 
take pictures or videos of their harassers, tag the pictures or videos with geolocation technology, 
and post them virtually on the internet or even in hard copy (on street signs or lampposts). Men 
who harass may see or hear of the public shaming and change their behavior. Perhaps snapping a 
cell phone camera in a harasser’s face could be the less risky equivalent of a “fight” incited by 
fighting words, allowing a woman to respond instead of being forced into silence. 
Social movements have succeeded in creating legal change in other contexts. Parallel 
grassroots social movements were helpful in advancing gay rights in the Massachusetts and Ver-
mont court systems, for example.
129
 In addition, courts acknowledged that changes in societal 
perceptions and norms led them to prohibit sexual misconduct—”suggestive remarks[,] derogato-
ry comments or direct demands for sex”—in the workplace.
130
 For example, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated, in finding the harassment of a woman’s co-workers sufficient to support the objec-
tive conduct requirement of IIED: 
                                                                
 125 See, e.g., The Rules of Digital Evidence, SN009 ALI-ABA 501, 518. 
           126 2012 #ENDSH Successes Part 5: Twenty-Five Stories, STOP STREET HARASSMENT (Dec. 28, 
2012), http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/2012/12/annualroundup5/. 
            127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY 
RIGHTS 46-47 (2002) (discussing the Vermont gay rights movement); Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2005) (discussing the Massachusetts gay rights movement).  
 130 Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1342 & n.3 (Wyo. 1997). Courts cited law review articles, 
e.g., Louise F. Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The Failure of Reason in the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1399, 1399 (1992); Carol Sanger, The Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1411, 1415 (1992), 
inter alia, for evidence of such societal evolution. Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1342. 
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It is worth stating forcefully that any other conclusion would amount to an in-
tolerable refusal to recognize that our society has ceased seeing sexual harass-
ment in the work place as a playful inevitability . . . and has awakened to the 
fact that sexual harassment has a corrosive effect on those who engage in it as 
well as those who are subjected to it and that such harassment has far more to 
do with the abusive exercise of one person’s power over another than it does 
with sex.
131
 
Preliminary research and the burgeoning social movement against street harassment in-
dicate it also has a corrosive effect on individuals in our streets and public places. It is not an ef-
fective method of “sexual play.” In my survey of street harassment stories, none have resulted in a 
productive social relationship between the harasser and the victim. It turns on fear and intimida-
tion rather than play or banter, and has more to do with abuse of male power and dominance to-
ward women who dare venture out into public. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I am hopeful that our society can evolve to extend the legal protections it granted women 
in the workplace to women in public spaces. A less gendered conception of the First Amendment 
and a more complete understanding of what street harassment is—a “true threat”—can grant full 
public participation and rights to women. Through the legal and social solutions I propose in this 
paper—leveraging sexual harassment law to pluck some low-hanging fruit and using technology 
and community education to capture as many one-off instances of street harassment as possible—
we can reduce the number of street harassment incidents and begin a virtuous cycle whereby 
courts unhesitatingly recognize the grievous harms and costs imposed on harassment victims. 
Measures to reduce gender-based verbal violence may also advance the goals of the First 
Amendment. If the “reasonable woman” no longer had to worry about being raped or sexually as-
saulted in public places, communication between men and women in public forums could be freer 
and healthier. Without the violent subordination of women, a more egalitarian society would ul-
timately mean a more expressive one. 
  
                                                                
                   131 Retherford v. AT&T Comms. of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992). 
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V. APPENDIX 
These statutes could also be read to proscribe street harassment. 
NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 240.26:  
HARASSMENT IN THE SECOND DEGREE 
A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy 
or alarm another person: 
1. He or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to physical 
contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same; or 
2. He or she follows a person in or about a public place or places; or 
3. He or she engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or 
seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose . . . . 
Harassment in the second degree is a violation.
132
 
NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 120.45:  
STALKING IN THE FOURTH DEGREE 
A person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for 
no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and knows or 
reasonably should know that such conduct: 
1. is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or 
property of such person . . . ; or 
2. causes material harm to the mental or emotional health of such person, where such 
conduct consists of following, telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such per-
son . . . and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct . . . . 
Stalking in the fourth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
133
 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.1: OPEN LEWDNESS 
A person commits a petty misdemeanor if he does any lewd act which he knows is likely 
to be observed by others who would be affronted or alarmed.
134
 
 
                                                                
132 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney 2014). 
133 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (McKinney 2014). 
134 MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.1. 
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